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I.   Introduction 
Electric power markets worldwide began to deregulate in the mid 1990s.  
Regulatory acts of the 1980s, such as PURPA in the U.S., had set the stage for 
independent power producers (“IPPs”) to construct power plants and contract directly 
with utilities and industrials.  As markets deregulated and the main industry players 
established themselves, energy trading became part of the industry.  Many of the 
independent firms began their own “merchant” power business, selling electricity at 
fluctuating market prices rather than through long term contracts. 
Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the power industry demonstrated 
enormous growth.  The enthusiasm that the IPPs showed for power plant construction 
was only bettered by Wall Street’s enthusiasm for financing them.  A downturn in the 
industry in late 2001 resulted in numerous defaults and financial distress1.  Figure 1 
shows the growth in liabilities of the distressed and bankrupt IPPs (all of which were 
‘distressed’ in 2002).   
Six firms in the industry defaulted with total liabilities at the time of default of 
$42B2 (listed in Appendix B).  However, an examination of the other public firms in the 
industry showed that virtually every other independent power producer was distressed 
(Appendix B).  Figure 2 shows the yield-to-maturity for a selection of bonds of the 
distressed companies, none of whom defaulted. 
                                                 
1 “Distress” – defined as having a yield to maturity at least 1000 basis points over High Yield Average for 
the year defined by Altman High Yield Bond Default and Return Report 
2 PG&E and Enron have been excluded from the sample because it is believed they are anomalies caused 
by poor government and fraud, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Liabilities of distressed and bankrupt IPPs3 
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Figure 2: Yields to Maturity for senior unsecured bonds of varying maturities4 
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The goal of this study is to try to determine whether the bankruptcies and 
financial distress experienced in the power industry could have been predicted using 
                                                 
3 Source:  Compustat 
4 Source:  Reuters (www.ejv.com) 
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known models.  Three firms are then examined in detail in an attempt to identify factors 
not captured by the model to illustrate why some firms declared bankruptcy while others 
did not.  The three firms are found to be similar in terms of common financial ratios.  
However, the main causes of bankruptcy are found to be relaxed ratings criteria that did 
not take increased risks into account as the industry changed and failure of management 
to act when faced with insolvency.  
II.   Bankruptcy Prediction Models 
Beaver (1967) was the first to use ratio analysis as a predictive tool for 
bankruptcy.  His univariate analysis set the stage for other methodologies developed 
including that by Altman in 1968.  Altman improved the technique of Beaver through the 
use of multi-discriminate analysis.  Altman determined five variables that reflected 
liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency, and activity.  These variables were chosen 
based on their contribution as univariate predictors, popularity amongst practitioners and 
correlation with other variables.  A later version of the Z-score was developed called the 
Z’’ (“Z double prime”).  It was developed specifically for firms in emerging markets, 
with unique financing structures or where asset turnover is potentially misleading.5  The 
final form of the Z-Score and the Z’’-score are in Appendix A.   
                                                 
5 Altman (2000) 
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Although it was developed in 1968, the Z-score continues to be relevant and 
accurate as a bankruptcy prediction tool.  In one study, it was found that the Type I6 
accuracy over three periods ranging from 1968 to 1997 ranged from 82%-94%.7 
Another study compared the accuracy of four bankruptcy prediction models: the 
Z-score, a cash flow “logit” model, a returns analysis model and a variance analysis 
model, on a sample of firms taken from the years 1980 to 1991. 8  The Z-score performed 
better than any of the other models resulting in a Type I accuracy of 80% and a Type II 
accuracy of 71% one period prior to default. 
Most bankruptcy prediction studies have focused on firms from a variety of 
industries, while few have focused on one particular industry.  Foreman set out to 
develop a new model based on bankruptcies of telecommunications firms (CLECS).9  It 
is unclear, however, how generic the model is and whether it can be applied to any other 
firm, or at any other time.  Ricci 10  tested the Z-score and a cash flow model 11  as 
predictors of bankruptcies.  The result was that the Z-score correctly classified 87% of 
bankrupt firms one period prior to bankruptcy however the model only correctly 
classified 30% of non-bankrupt firms, implying that the Z-scores for the entire telecom 
industry were very low and practically all firms were predicted to be bankrupt. 
                                                 
6 “Type I” accuracy refers to the correct classification of bankrupt firms as bankrupt;  “Type II” accuracy 
refers to the correct classification of non-bankrupt firms. 
7 Altman (2000) 
8 Mossman et al (1998) 
9 Foreman (2003) 
10 Ricci (2003) 
11 Foster and Ward (1997) 
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III.   Application of Bankruptcy Models to the Power Industry 
Following the lead of Ricci, the Z”-score was used to try to determine whether the 
bankruptcies in the power industry could have been predicted.  Figure 3 shows the Z’’-
Score for a sample of bankrupt firms in the power industry.  It appears that the Z’’-score, 
in general, declines for the year prior to bankruptcy for this sample.  However, the Z’’-
Score for distressed firms shows the historical range for this industry is low and the 
bankrupt firms are not significantly different than the distressed firms.   
Firms in the industry have continually operated in the “bankrupt” zone of the Z-
score.  There are two views that could be taken of this:  
1) The Z-score is inappropriate as a bankruptcy predictor for this industry.  
The natures of the firms are sufficiently unique that a model derived from other industries 
is meaningless. 
2) The Z-score is correct, and most firms are, and always have been, likely 
candidates for bankruptcy.  The markets of 2003 and 2004 were simply incredibly 
permissive and allowed bail-outs of those firms that made it through 2002. 
The Z-Score has not proven to be a conclusive indicator of bankruptcy for the 
power industry.  Three firms will be examined in detail in order to illustrate causes of 
bankruptcy that cannot be captured by a quantitative model.  Two of the firms to be 
examined, AES and Calpine, were distressed but did not default on their loans or become 
bankrupt.  The third firm, NRG Energy, defaulted on loans and subsequently underwent a 
Chapter 11 reorganization.  All three firms’ primary business is power generation. 
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Figure 3: Z''-Score for Bankrupt Firms 
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Figure 4: Z''-Score for Distressed Firms 
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IV.   Significant Events in the Industry 
Prior to delving into the details of the specific firms, a description is provided of 
some events that led to the downturn and distress in the power industry.  These events are 
relevant to all three of the firms that are discussed. 
California and PG&E 
Insufficient electric capacity in California caused power prices there to skyrocket 
during late 2000 and early 2001.  To appease consumers, PG&E was forced to sell power 
at low fixed prices regardless of the purchase price.  PG&E lost $9 billion in a matter of 
months and filed for bankruptcy in April 2001.  California embarked on a ‘witch hunt’ 
for the next two years bringing lawsuits against any and all merchant generators accusing 
them of trading improprieties. 
Weather 
The winter of 2001/2002 was particularly warm and then was followed by a cool 
summer in 2002, both of which are bad for energy trading.  Cold winters produce high 
gas prices and high electricity demand resulting in increased volatility.  Hot weather 
produces high electricity prices 
Oversupply 
During the expansion of the late 1990s, electricity demand grew at an increased 
rate and merchant generators constructed plants to meet the demand, often with the 
expectation that aging and polluting coal plants would be shut down.  The result of this 
enthusiasm was an over-supply of capacity and lower margins.  In addition, as the natural 
gas price increased, utilities became hesitant to shut down their coal plants due to lower 
prices for coal and therefore higher margins on sales.  
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Enron Bankruptcy 
When Enron declared bankruptcy in late 2001, not only did trading counter-
parties incur losses, but the result was increased scrutiny of all firms in the power 
industry and especially those with complicated financial structures.  Moody’s and S&P 
downgraded or put on credit-watch many of the merchant generating firms.  Bond prices 
declined immediately for all merchant generating firms. 
Worldcom 
On July 22, 2002, Worldcom filed for Chapter 11.  Although Worldcom had 
nothing to do with the power industry, it affected the credit markets and made it even 
more difficult to refinance debt.  The ratings agencies reacted, again increasing their 
scrutiny of firms with a lot of debt and complicated structures. 
V.   Applied Energy Services Corp (AES) 
History 
AES was founded in 1981 and originally built power and steam plants for 
industrial customers.  By the mid 1980's, AES was also providing electric utilities with 
power under long-term contracts that was below the utility's "avoided cost".  At this time, 
the company established its trademark project structure with significant reliance on "non-
recourse" project financing.12   
In the late 1980s, AES began its global expansion into the UK. Early in the 1990s, 
AES also entered Argentina, Pakistan, China, Australia and Kazakhstan, and later 
                                                 
12 Non-recourse financing is debt that is held at the subsidiary level and is non-recourse to the parent, 
meaning that if the subsidiary defaults, the parent is not liable for the debt.   
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acquired distribution companies and electric generating companies in countries such as 
Hungary and Brazil.  AES was added to the S&P 500 in 1998, and in 2000 the stock price 
exceeded $70 per share (market cap ~$28B).  
AES 1998-2001 
AES was in the middle of a period of extreme growth in 1998 operating plants 
generating 14,500 MW worldwide, with 5,254 MW under construction for a total of 
approximately 20,000 MW.  Most (or all) of this capacity was contracted.  AES had 
become one of the largest of the world’s independent power producers. 
By year-end 2001, AES had ownership of over 50,000 MW of capacity, an annual 
compounded growth of 60% since 1998.  Assets had grown to $36B, with total debt of 
$22B. 
Table 1: Breakdown of AES Net Income 
% of Pre-tax Income 
 
2001 2000 
Contract Generation 31% 31% 
Competitive Supply 9 % 21% 
Large Utilites 51% 46% 
Growth Distribution 9% 2% 
 
AES, in 2001, had diversified into four business units Growth Distribution, Large 
Utilities, Contracted Generation and Competitive Supply.  Growth Distribution represents 
generation and transmission assets in growing (emerging) economies.  Large Utilities 
represents five integrated utilities located in the US, Brazil and Venezuela.  Contracted 
Generation is their traditional business where power is sold forward through long-term 
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contracts and comprised 42% of capacity in 2001.  Competitive supply includes all plants 
with less than 75% of its capacity contracted or with power contracts less than 5 years 
and comprised 38% of capacity in 2001.  Competitive supply is used here as a proxy for 
merchant power, since it is hedged incompletely or only short-term.  The collapse of UK 
and US electricity prices resulted in competitive supply making up a smaller portion of 
AES revenues in 2001 compared with 2000. 
Table 2:  Overview  for AES (Consolidated), 1998 vs 2001 
 YE 1998 YE 2001 
Number of Projects 96 179 
Total MW 145,00 50,764 
MW in construction or 
pending acquisitions 5,254 7,500 
EBITDA (millions) 929 2,827 
LTD/Assets 54% 62% 
EBITDA to Int Exp 1.7x 2.0x 
Total Debt to EBITDA                 6.0x                8.0x  
Recourse Debt to EBITDA 1.8 1.9 
Corporate Unsecured Rating  BB  BB  
 
Capital Structure 
AES is organized as a holding company that is parent to over 100 international 
subsidiaries.  AES has always maintained a “project finance” structure whereby each 
subsidiary is financed by project level debt that is non-recourse to the parent company.  
The project level debt is secured by the assets of the subsidiary which typically consists 
of a single power plant.  These subsidiaries are financed with anywhere from 60%-85% 
debt and the remainder equity.  At the parent level, AES supplies the “equity” to the 
projects through traditional equity and unsecured, recourse debt.  Although the end result 
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is a firm that is highly levered, it is rationalized that the parent level debt is secured by 
the residual cash flows from numerous diversified projects.   
Some argue against a project finance structure because it is intrinsically expensive.  
As a firm grows, new projects do not take advantage of the lower cost of borrowing that a 
large firm with corporate level debt enjoys.  The result is higher interest costs and more 
frequent transacting costs.  However, a benefit to this structure is its inherent optionality.  
Should the project not perform as planned, the parent firm has the option to “put” the 
project back to the lenders without direct recourse (besides reputational damage). 
On a consolidated basis, AES has maintained a ratio of liabilities to assets of 
approximately 85%.  Non-recourse debt increased from 33% to 40% of assets from 1998 
to 2001, perhaps as a result of lower interest rates and thus a higher capacity for projects 
to take on debt or alternatively, due to the lending markets newfound comfort in the 
power industry. 
AES is one of few firms that provides both a consolidated and an unconsolidated 
balance sheet, which allows some insight into just the parent corporation without the 
subsidiaries.  On an unconsolidated basis, the amount of recourse debt on AES’s Balance 
Sheet increased from 40% to 49% of assets, or from 50% to 67% of Investments in 
Projects from 1998 to 2001.  AES (parent) has let its current assets grow in the form of 
notes receivable from subsidiaries indicating that non-performing subsidiaries are being 
funded by AES.  The net result is that AES has increased its leverage as it has expanded. 
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Table 3: AES Corp - Balance Sheet (Consolidated)  - 1998/2001 
Consolidated Balance Sheet (AES) Common Size
 1998 2001 1998 2001
Current Assets             1,254             4,653 12% 13%
Net PP&E             5,545           23,434 51% 64%
Investments in Projects             1,933             3,100 18% 8%
Other Non-Current Assets             2,049             5,549 19% 15%
Total Assets           10,781           36,736 100% 100%
  
Current Liabilities             1,976             5,041 18% 14%
Minority Interest                  -              1,530 0% 4%
Non-Recourse Debt             3,597           14,673 33% 40%
Recourse Debt             1,644             5,891 15% 16%
Other Non-Current Liabilities             1,770             4,062 16% 11%
Total Liabilities             8,987           31,197 83% 85%
  
Retained Earnings             1,120             2,809 10% 8%
Total Equity             1,794             5,539 17% 15%
Total Liabilities and Equity           10,781           36,736 100% 100%
 
Table 4: AES Corp - Balance Sheet (Unconsolidated) - 1998/2001 
Unconsolidated Balance Sheet (AES) Common Size 
 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Current Assets            446          3,172 11% 26% 
Net PP&E              -                -  0% 0% 
Investments in Projects         3,390          8,697 83% 72% 
Other Non-Current Assets            244             172 6% 1% 
Total Assets         4,080        12,041 100% 100% 
  
Current Liabilities             65             611 2% 5% 
Minority Interest              -                -  0% 0% 
Non-Recourse Debt              -                -  0% 0% 
Recourse Debt         1,644          5,891 40% 49% 
Other Non-Current Liabilities            577               -  14% 0% 
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Unconsolidated Balance Sheet (AES) Common Size 
 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Total Liabilities         2,286          6,502 56% 54% 
  
Retained Earnings         1,892          2,551 46% 21% 
Total Equity         1,794          5,539 44% 46% 
Total Liabilities and Equity         4,080        12,041 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 5: Debt coverage ratios for AES (recourse debt) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Parent-EBITDA 285 (est.)  871 1038 
Int Expense Net 48  133 240 
Interest Coverage 5.9x  6.5x 4.3x 
Recourse Debt 1,644  4,694 5,891 
Debt/EBITDA 5.8x  5.4x 5.7x 
 
AES reports its Operating Cash Flow to Parent (also called parent-EBITDA). 13 This is a measure 
that is relevant to the recourse debt, whereas Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) or other 10-K data 
will generally be consolidated and relevant only to total recourse and non-recourse debt.   
 
Table 5 shows that Debt/EBITDA has remained relatively constant but the 
interest coverage ratio declined in 2001. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Parent-EBITDA was not stated in 1998 or 1999 and has been estimated for 1998 as Dividends from 
Subsidiaries and Affiliates.   
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Timeline 
The following contains a timeline summarizing AES path into financial distress, 
and the actions that were taken to restructure. 
Dec 2001 AES bond prices decreased with the rest of the industry over fears of 
another Enron (see Figure 5 for stock and bond prices). 
Jan-Jul 2002 Political turmoil in South America had caused considerable depreciation 
in the Brazilian, Venezuelan and Argentinian currencies.  AES had 
approximately 30% of its consolidated revenues and 30% of its gross 
margin generated in South America. 
In Argentina, the government had rescinded its energy policy such that 
all payments would be made in Argentine pesos rather than USD and 
removal of pesos from the country would be limited. 
In the US, the spark spread (the spread between power prices and natural 
gas cost) had declined substantially from its highs in 2000.  
In the UK, the power markets had collapsed, and cash flows from the 
AES Drax plant would be significantly reduced. 
AES announced that it expected a decrease in distributions to the parent 
corporation of approximately $100 million (10% of parent level 
EBITDA). 
May 2002 Downgrades of Calpine, Mirant, and Dynegy caused bond prices to 
decrease further.  There are speculations of liquidity concerns due to debt 
maturing in December 2002.  AES announces that it is in negotiations to 
sell subsidiary CILCORP generating $540MM of cash. 
July 2002 Worldcom filed for Chapter 11.  AES bonds decreased to the low levels 
that would remain until October (~$0.40). 
Jul-Oct 2002 AES has $300 million in Senior notes coming due December 15, 2002.  
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In addition, it has an $850 million revolver coming due March 2003, and 
$200 million in notes in Jun 2003.   
Following Enron, and Worldcom, the credit markets are particularly 
tight.  Most firms in the industry are trying to refinance current debt.   
After a number of years of expansion, there had been little contemplation 
of credit drying up. 
There is speculation whether AES has the liquidity to repay the maturing 
debt particularly with cash flows declining.  AES bonds steadily decline 
in price to lows of $0.30. 
Jul 2002 Announces sale of subsidiary for $240 million (New Energy).  This is 
well received but liquidity is still an issue and bond prices remain low. 
Oct 24, 2002 AES proposes a refinancing plan.  All debt coming due in 2002, and 
early 2003 will be refinanced with new 10% senior notes due in 2005 and 
a $1.6 million credit facility.   
It is proposed that holders of the $300 million notes due in December 
2002 will receive 50% of the face value in cash, and another 50% in new 
notes.  Receiving $0.50 immediately is a good deal for the bond holders 
since the bonds are currently trading around $0.30.  Bond prices increase 
substantially. 
Holders of the $200 million notes coming due in June 2003 will 
exchange at face value for the new notes, which are more senior and have 
a higher coupon.  It is not clear how much more these holders gain from 
this exchange. 
The $1.6 million credit facility will repay the revolver and several loans 
of AES subs.  Half of it comes due in Nov 2004, and half in 2005. 
Further details are given in Appendix C 
Nov 2002 Announces sale of CILCORP for $1.4B, generating $540 million cash. 
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Dec 13, 2002 The refinancing plan is accepted.  The only change is that the 
$300 million noteholders will receive 65% cash and 35% new notes, 
further improving their deal. 
May 2003 AES secures a $1.8 billion private placement to pay off part of credit 
facility from December and extend maturity of some notes coming due 
2008-2011.  The new debt matures 2013 and 2015. 
2003 Announced $1.0 billion of asset sales.  Refinancing of more debt, which 
included extended maturities and consolidating all short term loans into a 
$700 million term loan due 2008.  Also completed an equity offering of 
$337 million. 
2004 AES continues to sell assets.   
Refinances high interest rate debt with longer term, lower coupon notes.  
Repays December credit facility.  Extends term of revolver to 2007. 
2005 Stock is trading at above $16, up from lows of $2 in 2002.  Bonds are 
trading at or above par. 
Figure 5 shows the stock and bond prices for AES from 1998 to 2004.   The 
events described were clearly reflected in the market prices of these securities.  Bond 
prices reacted abruptly as AES refinanced and threats of insolvency were removed.  
Stock prices did not change as drastically, but began increasing when the bonds returned 
to par. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of AES Stock and Senior Unsecured Bond14 prices 
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Further details of AES’ restructuring are included in Appendix C. 
VI.   Calpine Corporation 
Overview 
Calpine was founded in 1984 by Peter Cartwright to participate in the independent 
power industry.  By 1992, Calpine had total assets of $55 million.  Their business 
strategy was to build the most efficient plants and become the low-cost producer in any 
given market.  Peter Cartwright is a solid believer in electricity deregulation and believes 
                                                 
14 AES bond prices refer to (1) Senior Unsecured Bond Due 2011, 8.875% Coupon  and (2) Senior 
Unsecured Bond Due 2008, 8.5% Coupon and (3) Senior Subordinated 8.375% Coupon, due 2007 
 113
that the consumer will ultimately receive lower prices.  His goal, as of 2001, was to build 
70,000 MW of capacity entirely of highly efficient gas fired power plants15. 
Calpine vertically integrated by purchasing natural gas resources, turbine parts 
manufacturers, and a trading organization.  In addition, significant economies of scale 
and expertise have been developed in construction and plant operations. 
CPN: 1998-2001 
Between 1998 and 2001, Calpine had grown at a compounded annual rate of 
130% (assets) and 80% (capacity in operation and construction).  Calpine grew their 
installed MW base from 2,200MW to 12,000MW between 1998 and 2001 through an 
aggressive construction and acquisition strategy.  As of 2001, Calpine had an additional 
14,000MW under construction or pending acquisitions.  Their goal was to reach 
70,000 MW by 2005. 
In 1998, virtually all of its capacity was contracted.  By 2001, Calpine had 65% of 
its capacity sold forward, or otherwise contracted, with the remaining amount unhedged, 
merchant capacity. 
Table 6: Overview  for Calpine 1998 and 2001 
($millions) YE 1998 YE 2001 
Number of Projects 22 54  
Total MW 2,065 12,089  
MW in construction or pending 
acquisition 
2,206 14,142  
EBITDA $255 $1,595  
LTD/Assets 68% 60% 
                                                 
15 Wall St. Transcript, 2001. 
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($millions) YE 1998 YE 2001 
EBITDA to Int Exp 2.9x  9.7x  
Total Debt to EBITDA 4.3x 8.0x  
Total Recourse Debt to EBITDA 3.7x 8.0x 
Corporate Unsecured Rating BB+ BB+ 
Capital Structure 
Calpine, unlike AES, holds most of its debt at the corporate level.  Although 
Calpine has some debt that is titled non-recourse or project level, it has provided a 
corporate guaranty, meaning that the debt will be covered by Calpine on default.  In 
addition Calpine has “cross-default” provisions on its non-recourse debt, meaning that 
default at the project level will result in default of the parent, or, default of the parent will 
result in default at the project level.  Calpine plainly states these cross-default provisions 
in both its 2000 and 2001 10-K and therefore analysts treat all of Calpine’s debt as being 
recourse debt. 
Table 7:  Calpine Corp. - Cash Flows and Debt Service 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
EBITDA 282 433 1,016 1,600 
Int Expense 96 103 75 165 
Total Debt 1,216 2,262 4,757 12,728 
Interest Coverage 2.9x 4.2x 13.5x 9.7x 
Total Debt/EBITDA 4.3x 5.2x 4.7x 8.0x 
 
Much of Calpine’s recent construction has been financed by two loans called 
CCFC I and CCFC II (Calpine Construction Finance Corporation) that are secured by the 
assets under construction until completion at which time corporate debt will be used to 
take out the construction revolver. 
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Calpine has maintained a capital structure with approximately 85% liabilities to 
assets from 1998 through 2001.  This leverage ratio has not changed as the firm moved 
from contracted assets to a blend of contracted and merchant plants.  
Table 8: Calpine Corp- Balance Sheet - 1998/2001 
Balance Sheet (CPN) Common Size
 1998 2001 1998 2001
Current Assets                209             4,007 12% 19%
Net PP&E             1,094           15,385 63% 72%
Investments in Projects                221                378 13% 2%
Other Non-Current Assets                205             1,539 12% 7%
Total Assets             1,729           21,309 100% 100%
  
Current Liabilities                122             3,228 7% 15%
Minority Interest                  -                  47 0% 0%
Non-Recourse Debt                114             3,393 7% 16%
Recourse Debt                951             9,553 55% 45%
Other Non-Current Liabilities                255             2,078 15% 10%
Total Liabilities             1,442           18,299 83% 86%
  
Retained Earnings                118             1,196 7% 6%
Total Equity                287             3,010 17% 14%
Total Liabilities and Equity             1,729           21,309 100% 100%
 
Calpine provides, as part of its financial statements EBITDA as a proxy for cash 
flow for debt and fixed charge coverage (Table 7).  Calpine’s total debt to EBITDA ratio 
has increased substantially from 2000 to 2001 and is now at a high of 8.0x EBITDA.  
This may be due to the massive construction program it is undertaking which requires it 
to take on debt for assets that are not yet generating revenues.  Interest coverage as of 
2001 remains substantial at 9.7x. 
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Timeline 
The following timeline summarizes the events that lead to Calpine’s distress and 
the actions taken to maintain solvency. 
Dec 2001 Fitch downgrades Calpine from BBB- (lowest investment grade) to BB+ 
(highest non-investment grade), bond prices decline, and stock price is 
declining from ~$20 (see Figure 6). 
Calpine issues $1.2B in convertible senior notes. And repurchases 
$315 million of zero coupon bonds. 
Jan 2002 Calpine secures a $1B credit facility.  In addition to their $400M facility 
that comes due May 2003, there is little risk of bankruptcy for the near 
term although bond prices decline to $0.80. 
They announce that only the 14,000MW that are currently under 
construction will be completed and other development will be put on hold, 
resulting in reduced capital expenditures of $2.0B for 2002.  To put this to 
scale, Calpine had plans to have a total of 70,000 MW in operation by 
2005, up from the current 11,000 MW.  
Calpine renegotiates gas turbine purchases reducing capital expenditures 
by $1.2B in 2002 and $1.8B in 2003. 
Feb-Mar 
2002 
In mid-February there were concerns that January’s $1B credit facility was 
not going to close (stock price drops to $6.80).  In March it was 
announced that they had secured a $1.6B credit facility, $1B of which 
would come due in May 2003 along with their existing $400M credit 
facility and the remainder in 2005 (stock price rebounds to $12.83).    
Bond prices drop to $0.73 in mid Feb and rebound to $0.80 but remain 
below the $1 from late 2001. 
Apr 2002 Sells power and plants to Wisconsin Public Service (WPS) and 
 117
renegotiates existing contracts with California DWR.  Issues equity for a 
total of $800MM.  Bond prices rise to $0.80 and the stock hovers around 
$12. 
Jul-Aug 
2002 
Expectations of a cool summer lead to revised EPS estimates, and renewed 
liquidity concerns.  Calpine is downgraded along with Dynegy and Mirant 
late June 2002 with NRG in July.  The summer ultimately is quite cool and 
earnings are low.  Bond prices in August drop to $0.43 with implied yields 
to maturity of above 25%.  Stock prices drop to $3.40. 
Sept-Dec 
2002 
Stock prices continue to plummet to below $2 and are valued merely at the 
option value of the plants.  Bond prices fall to the low $0.30’s with yields 
above 30%.   
In response Calpine manages to sell several assets including a number of 
natural gas assets, complete a number of project financings, and monetize 
some of its Canadian assets through an income fund. 
Jan-March 
2003 
The main obligations coming due are $400MM of a $1B revolver in May 
2003 and $1B in October 2003 for its CCFCI construction facility.  CCFCI 
is secured by approximately $3.0B in assets, and it is likely that the banks 
will roll this over. 
Calpine has not been as successful as planned in selling assets, or raising 
money through contract securitizations, sales leasebacks, and project 
financings.  There are $3.5B in obligations coming due n 2004. 
Despite the dire news, bond prices have increased to approximately $0.50 
perhaps due to other industry participants’ refinancings giving some 
glimmer of hope. 
May-Jul 
2003 
June 24 Calpine announced that they had signed a termsheet for 
refinancing a $1.0B revolver with another $1.0B revolver.   
June 27 Calpine announced that instead they were looking for a $1.8B 
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private placement.  July 11 they announced $3.3B of refinancing 
(summarized in Appendix D). 
Simultaneously with the $3.3B refinancing, Calpine secured a new 
$500MM working capital revolver.  $200MM of which is a four year term 
loan and $300MM is a line of credit which was undrawn as of year end 
2003.   
Following this event, bond prices moved up to high $0.70s and low $0.80s 
with yield of ~13-15%. 
Aug-Dec 
2003 
Throughout the rest of the year, Calpine continued to sell projects and 
monetize assets, albeit at a slow pace. 
In Nov 2003, Calpine issued another $1.3B of debt to repay debt coming 
due.  Part of the new debt includes $660MM of new convertibles (with a 
lower conversion price and a longer maturity than prior issues).  The 
remainder of the offering consisted of $900MM of 2011 notes. 
At this point, the end of 2003, Calpine has removed all impediments to 
insolvency for the short term.  In 2004, the largest item coming due is the 
CCFCII construction loan which is secured against 14 plants under 
construction with a value substantially higher than the face value of the 
loan.  Their bonds are trading at around $0.80 implying a yield of 
approximately 13%. 
2004-2005 Calpine has continued to issue debt, monetize and sell assets.  There is 
speculation that they are nearing their debt capacity and the power markets 
fail to improve.  Senior Unsecured bonds are currently (Mar 30, 2005) 
trading at approximately $0.70, implying a yield of 16% (Sr. Unsecured, 
8.75% due 2011), and the stock is trading at an option value of $2.60 
down from its highs of $55. 
 119
Figure 6 shows the stock and bond prices for Calpine from 1998 to 2004.   The 
events described are reflected in the market prices of these securities. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Stock and Unsecured Bond Prices for Calpine16 
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Calpine has shown considerable skill in accessing the capital markets and has 
used the flexibility that it had maintained in its capital structure as of 2001 to generate 
cash and maintain solvency.  It has still not recovered because of the overcapacity that 
remains in the US power industry.  AES on the other hand had a considerable amount of 
international exposure of both contracted and uncontracted assets that were uncorrelated 
                                                 
16 Calpine Senior Unsecured Bond, 8.5% Coupon, due 2011 
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with the US markets and to that extent were able to recover.  It is questionable what the 
next few years will bring for Calpine. 
VII.   NRG Energy Inc. 
History 
NRG Energy Inc. began business in 1989 as a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Northern States Power (NSP).  On June 5, 2000, NRG completed its initial public 
offering.  In August 2000, NSP merged with New Century Energies to become Xcel 
Energy.  Xcel owns interests in a number of non-regulated businesses, the largest of 
which is NRG.  In March 2001, Xcel owned 74% of the common stock of NRG which 
represented 96.7% of the voting shares.  On June 3, 2002, Xcel completed its exchange 
offer for the 26% of NRG’s shares that had previously been publicly held.  Xcel 
purchased the remainder of the shares due to their low price and with the intent of 
injecting more equity into NRG to maintain its investment grade credit rating. 
NRG 1998-2001 
In the 1990’s NRG pursued a strategy of growth through acquisitions.  Starting in 
2000, NRG added the development of new construction projects to this strategy.  The 
strategy required significant capital much of which was satisfied with third party debt.  
As of Dec. 31, 2001, NRG had 9.4B$ of debt on its consolidated balance sheet including 
$4.0B of corporate debt and $5.4B of consolidated project debt.   This is an increase from 
Dec 31, 1998 where NRG had just over $500MM of both non-recourse and recourse debt 
on its balance sheet.  During that time, the generating capacity owned by NRG had 
increased from 3,300MW to over 20,300 MW. 
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In the 1998 Annual Report, NRG first announced that several of their new 
projects would operate on a “merchant” basis, including projects in Australia and the US.  
The announced merchant projects would amount to approximately 50% of NRG’s 
capacity in 1998.   By 2001, NRG had over 20,000 MW in operation and over 3,000 in 
development.  Of this, approximately 45% was merchant.   In 2000, NRG also added new 
construction to their business activities. 
Table 9: Corporate Statistics for NRG, 1998 vs 2001 
 YE 1998 YE 2001 
Number of Projects 40             75  
Total MW 3,300       20,733  
MW in construction or pending 
acquisitions -  3,460  
EBITDA (millions) $83   $954  
LTD/Assets 48% 65% 
EBITDA to Int Exp 1.63x  2.15x  
Total Debt to EBITDA 7.6     8.8  
Recourse Debt to EBITDA 6.2 3.1 
Corporate Unsecured Rating (S&P) BBB- BBB- 
 
NRG 2001-2002 
In November 2001, NRG was negotiating the purchase of four coal plants for 
$1.5B.  Industry analysts were in favor of the transaction: 
“We believe NRG can achieve solid long-term compounded annual EPS growth 
of 15%...... We are confident that NRG can achieve our conservative growth 
targets given the quality of its assets, hedging strategy, fuel diversification, risk 
management skills and current pipeline of projects.”17  
                                                 
17 UBS Warburg Equity Research, Nov. 30, 2001 
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In December 2001, following the bankruptcy of Enron, Moody’s placed NRG’s 
Senior Unsecured notes on review for a potential downgrade citing the effect of the 
aforementioned acquisition as the reason.  In an effort to maintain an investment grade 
credit rating, Xcel purchased the 26% outstanding shares of NRG and provided a 
$500MM cash infusion. 
During July and August 2002, NRG’s credit rating was lowered from BBB-, to 
BB and then B by Standard and Poor’s and to Baa3 to B1 by Moody’s.   
NRG had provided corporate guarantees for the debt of some of its projects with 
the stipulation that cash collateral or letters of credit would be provided if its credit rating 
were to be reduced by Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s to below investment grade. The 
credit downgrade caused a requirement for $1.85B of collateral to be posted immediately.  
Collateral was needed to cover project level debt service reserve accounts, 
trading/marketing activities, and a Contingent Equity Guarantee on a construction 
revolver. 
In November 2002, NRG Energy and its subsidiary NRG NorthEast filed petitions 
for Chapter 11.  NRG defaulted on the payment of $127.6MM of interest on recourse 
debt issues and $138.2MM in interest and principle payments on non-recourse debt in 
2002 and early 2003.   
Capital Structure 
The assets of NRG grew at a compounded rate of 120% during the period 1998-
2001.  In 1998, NRG’s Balance Sheet looked more like that of a passive investor having 
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62% of its assets as non-controlling (<50%) investments in projects accounted for using 
the equity method.  Liabilities made up 55% of assets and equity the remainder. 
In 2001, liabilities had increased to 83% of assets, which  was typical of other 
firms in the industry.  Projects were more often being financed by non-recourse debt.  
NRG had begun to construct its own projects, and generally owned a majority stake in the 
projects. 
Table 10: NRG Energy - Balance Sheet 1998/2001 
Balance Sheet (NRG) Common Size
 1998 2001 1998 2001
Current Assets                  92             1,187 7% 9%
Net PP&E                205             9,432 16% 73%
Investments in Projects                801             1,051 62% 8%
Other Non-Current Assets                196             1,224 15% 9%
Total Assets             1,293           12,895 100% 100%
  
Current Liabilities                  51             1,951 4% 15%
Minority Interest                  14                 68 1% 1%
Non-Recourse Debt                113             4,871 9% 38%
Recourse Debt                381             2,972 29% 23%
Other Non-Current Liabilities                156                795 12% 6%
Total Liabilities                714           10,657 55% 83%
  
Retained Earnings                130                635 10% 5%
Total Equity                579             2,237 45% 17%
Total Liabilities and Equity             1,293           12,895 100% 100%
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Some might argue18 for the inclusion of a pro-rata share of assets and liabilities 
rather than the equity method of accounting, however, doing so does not change the ratios 
substantially.  For example, the total liabilities on the balance sheet for 2001 would 
increase by $2.2B and the assets by $3.6B. 
An “adjusted CFO” measure was used as a proxy for cash available to service 
interest payments.  It can be seen that the results for 1998 and 1999, while NRG was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of NSP (now Xcel), are nonsensical.  Moreover, NRG’s interest 
coverage ratio had decreased and the debt/CFO had increased from 2000-2001.  NRG had 
a number of assets that did not perform and as such were restricted from distributing cash 
to their parent.  Also, this is a reflection of the exposure to the declining merchant 
markets.   
Table 11: NRG Energy - Interest Coverage Ratio 
($millions) 1998 1999 2000 2001 
adjusted CFO $47 $56 $748 $752 
Int Exp $50 $93 $294 $443 
Total Debt $520 $2,346 $3,803 $9,173 
Int Coverage 1.0x 0.60x 2.54x 1.7x 
Debt/ adjusted CFO 11x 42x 5.1x 12.2x 
 
Timeline 
The following timeline provides a summary of events from late 2001 through 
NRG’s default and bankruptcy filing. 
                                                 
18 Singleton (2000) 
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Oct 2001 Morgan Stanley has a buy rating with a 12 month price target of $42 
from the current $17.  Buy reduced to Hold in December as it lowers 
rating on entire industry. 
Nov 2001 NRG announces that it will purchase 2500MW from First Energy for 
$1.5B.  UBS reiterates a Strong Buy. 
Dec 2001 Moody’s placed NRG credit rating on review (currently at Baa3 – the 
lowest investment grade).  Incidentally, S&P ‘confirmed’ a BBB- rating 
at this time.    
A downgrade to below investment grade would result in NRG having to 
post approximately $960MM of collateral within 30 days due to 
guarantees posted by NRG parent to its subsidiaries.  The guarantees are 
required for: $200MM for debt service coverage, $400MM required for 
power marketing activities, and $360MM for the Contingent Equity 
Guarantee that goes with its corporate revolver which could increase by 
the end of 2002 as NRG draws down the revolver bringing the total 
potential collateral required to $1.85B. 
Dec 2001 Xcel as primary shareholder sought to preserve NRG’s investment grade 
rating and contributed $500MM to NRG.  
Feb 2001 A plan is announced to maintain NRG’s credit rating that includes 
primarily a cash influx from Xcel but also non-aggressive plans to begin 
selling assets 
June 2002 Xcel buys remaining 26% of NRG shares.  On June 25, 2002, S&P 
downgraded Xcel to from BBB+ to BBB-, NRG unsecured bonds begin 
downward decline. 
July 2002 July 1 S&P affirmed the senior unsecured debt of the NRG Energy unit at 
BBB-, S&P's lowest investment grade, but took it off CreditWatch- 
Positive where the company was put Feb. 11, 2002, after Xcel announced 
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plans to reacquire it. S&P's outlook on NRG is now negative.  There are 
also other downgrades including Dynegy Mirant and Calpine19 
July 2002 Worldcom files Bankruptcy July 21, 2002. 
S&P and Moody’s downgraded NRG to below investment grade on July 
26 and July 29 respectively, thus resulting in immediate collateral call of 
approximately $1.0B (never actually posted). 
Xcel actually has cross-default provisions with NRG and one of the 
reasons they offer to eventually offer to contribute cash to settle 
creditor’s bankruptcy suitspony up money.  Xcel manages to renegotiate 
this term in Aug 2002. 
Aug 7, 2002 NRG downgraded again to B by S&P 
Sept 2002 Sept, 16, 2002 NRG didn’t make interest payments due resulting in the 
immediate acceleration of approximately $1.85B.  
Nov 22, 2002 NRG files Chapter 11 
Feb 2003 An additional $1.0B of payments accelerated under corporate revolver. 
Mar 2003 It is agreed that Xcel will pay NRG creditors $640MM for release of any 
and all claims against it. 
                                                 
19 Power Market Week, July 2002 
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Figure 7: Stock and Unsecured Bond Prices for NRG Energy (prior to Bankruptcy)20 
12/13/2001
8/8/2002
6/20/2002
11/29/2001
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Oct-00 Jan-01 Apr-01 Jul-01 Oct-01 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02 Oct-02 Dec-02 Mar-03 Jun-03
St
oc
k 
Pr
ic
e 
($
)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
B
on
d 
Pr
ic
e 
($
)
Bond Prices
Stock Price
 
Figure 7 shows the stock and bond prices for NRG from 1998 to 2004.   As the 
events unfolded their effects were reflected in the market prices of these securities. 
On Re-Emergence from Bankruptcy 
The Plan of Reorganization for NRG Energy Inc. resulted in recovery of 50% of 
Unsecured Claims (Class 5) and 43.9% of PMI Unsecured Claims (Class 6) for total 
relief of $3.3B.   In addition, Xcel Energy was accused of numerous misdeeds and settled 
all suits with the contribution of $640MM to the reorganized NRG Energy. 
NRG re-emerged from bankruptcy Dec 3, 2003.  The share price increased from 
$24 to $35 (as of April 2005) giving a market capitalization of $3.5B.  The Dec 31 2003 
                                                 
20 Source:  Thomson - Datastream 
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Balance Sheet is shown compared to the BS from 2001 in Appendix E.  They currently 
have interests in 72 power projects totaling 18,200MW. 
Balance sheet changes from year-end 2001 and the emergence from Chapter 11 in 
2003 include: 
 An addition of $500MM of equity in early 2001 by Xcel 
 A payment of $640MM in 2003 by Xcel to settle lawsuits and allegations 
 Asset sales, and a writedown of assets of over $3 Billion 
 forgiveness of over $3 Billion in debt 
VIII.   Discussion 
Overview 
AES, Calpine, and NRG were compared to illustrate the complexities within the 
unregulated power sector particularly during the year 2002.  AES participates primarily 
in international markets and its financial distress was caused by crises in South America, 
UK, and the US.  Calpine operates natural gas-fired power plants in the United States and 
had to scale back its massive development plans due to weak fundamentals in that market.  
NRG operates worldwide however its exposure to the US market combined with a capital 
structure contingent on ratings caused sudden and unpredictable insolvency. 
Other factors that differentiate the firms are discussed below. 
Financial Analysis 
Financial data is presented for the period from 1998 onwards for the three firms in 
order to compare the structure and risk associated with each of the firms. 
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Figure 8: Comparison of financial measures for Calpine, AES and NRG 
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It can be seen from the upper left chart in Figure 8 that in years 2000 and 2001, 
the CFO/Total Liabilities of Calpine and NRG are approximately the same.  
Inconsistencies and generally poor reporting in earlier years may account for the 
variability between firms.  The market capitalization ratio (upper right), shows that all 
three firms were similarly capitalized, with Calpine relatively less levered during 2000 
when stock prices were at their peak.   The firms have virtually identical book 
capitalization ratios also (lower left).  And finally, the Z’’score shows again that these 
three firms have remarkably similar values.  NRG exhibits more volatility over the period 
which could be in part due to their changing capital structure (full ownership and 
consolidation).  It is interesting that the Z’’-Score has not increased from 1998 to 2001 as 
the industry became more mature and the risk characteristics of the business increased as 
firms began selling uncontracted, merchant power. 
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Table 12: Operating Comparison 
 AES Calpine NRG 
Merchant 
Capacity 38% 35% 45% 
% of Operating 
Capacity in 
Construction 
15% 115% 17% 
 
A comparison of operating makeup of each company is shown in Table 12.  As of 
year end 2001, NRG has an estimated 45% of its capacity as merchant generation, 
whereas AES and Calpine have somewhat less.  This would have had a significant effect 
on NRG as the US power market collapsed.  The more capacity that was contracted, the 
more able to withstand the downturn a firm would be.  Calpine on the other hand, has a 
massive amount of capacity in construction, with 14,000 MW in construction and 
12,000 MW operating. One would expect the capacity in construction to strain a firm as it 
is not yet generating revenue but has incurred expenditures. 
A comparison of a number of measures of leverage and risk show that the firms 
are similar in many respects. 
Management Commitment 
All firms in the industry were faced with the same scrutiny, declining market 
conditions, and restrictions in capital markets.  Using asset sales and other liquidity 
enhancements as a proxy, the commitment and seriousness of management can be 
measured.  Table 13 shows what measures were taken by Calpine and AES prior-to and 
post- the downgrade of NRG in July 2002.  
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Table 13: Comparison of measures to improve liquidity 
  Calpine AES
Prior to July 2002 Reduction in Capital Spending 
(includes planned turbine purchases) 
$3,200 
(millions) 
unspecified
 New Financing $2,522 $0
 Monetization of assets21 negotiations $260
 Asset Sales $0 $780
Post July 2002 New Financing  $1,600
 Sale of Plants and Gas Properties  $471 $174
 Monetizing assets $362.5 $0
Total 2002  $6,555 $2,814
 
AES responded quickly with asset sales.  It announced the agreements to sell its 
CILCORP utility and New Energy marketing business generating $780MM cash 
(transactions closed post July).  Calpine took on $2.5B in new debt, perhaps sensing the 
coming liquidity crisis and drastically cut its development program, of which, the 
renegotiation of turbine purchase commitments alone saved $1.2B for 2002 and $1.8B in 
2003. 
In February 2002, NRG reacted slowly to threats of a downgrade, more like a 
staunch utility rather than an independent upstart.  It announced a plan consisting of four 
elements: 1) financial support from Xcel; 2) asset sales (by the end of 2002); 3) capital 
spending reductions, and 4) combining systems with Xcel.  By July when NRG was 
downgraded, Xcel had contributed $500MM to NRG, they had not sold any assets, and 
all capital spending reductions had been scheduled for 2003 and 2004.  In fact, NRG was 
                                                 
21 Includes project financing, sale/leaseback transactions, income trusts (Canada), and other 
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still aggressively pursuing acquisitions including the $1.5B acquisition that caused the 
original credit concerns. 
The behavior of management is obviously a determinant in whether a firm can 
restructure or not.  In this case, NRG management either disregarded the threats of 
downgrade or lacked the ability to follow through with liquidity-enhancements.   
Capital Structure 
The three firms illustrate the range of capital structure available.   
AES maintains a ‘classic’ project finance structure where debt is held at each 
project that is non-recourse to the parent firm.  There are ongoing financial disadvantages 
as discussed previously however, a key advantage is that the parent firm can ‘put’ the 
project back to its lenders if it doesn’t perform as AES did with its Drax UK facility and 
threatened to with AES Gener in Brazil.   This provides the firm with some significant 
value during difficult times. 
Calpine has virtually no project level, non-recourse debt.  A key advantage to this 
structure is the level of flexibility it provides to the parent firm.  Calpine was able to sell 
assets, as well as monetize facilities through income trusts, sale/leaseback transactions 
and other means.   
Table 14: Comparison of Recourse Debt to Total Debt 
 Calpine AES NRG 
Recourse Debt 
 to Total Debt 
~100% 27% 38% 
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NRG originally looked like an investment firm with few consolidated assets.  
However by 2001, it had a structure that was a hybrid of Calpine and AES with a large 
amount of non-recourse debt at the subsidiary level.  Some of the subsidiaries consisted 
of a ‘pool’ of assets (NRG Northeast for example) perhaps as a means of reducing 
transaction costs or providing risk reduction through diversification.  A key inconsistency 
of the financing structure is the guarantee of the subsidiary debt, and in this case doing so 
through “contingent liabilities’ – guarantees based on credit rating.  Not only do cash 
flows get trapped at the projects, a disadvantage of the project-finance structure, but the 
parent firm is ultimately liable for the debt repayment.  Also a certain amount of 
flexibility to sell assets is removed as lenders are secured against those assets and may be 
opposed to full or partial disposition of their security. 
One cannot conclude that one financial structure is better than another, however, 
on balance, NRG may have had the least flexibility to make it through tough times. 
IX.   The Role of the Ratings Agencies 
Perhaps the most interesting part of this study has been the role of the ratings 
agencies during this period and particularly with respect to the bankruptcy of NRG.   
This study leads one has to fundamentally question the value of a credit rating.  
NRG had an investment grade rating but a downturn in the industry resulted in the 
bankruptcy of the firm in less than one year.  Ironically, the cause of the bankruptcy was 
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a downgraded rating. Moody’s Rating Action of Dec 2001 22  did not mention the 
contingent liabilities that would be triggered by a downgrade.  This leads one to believe 
that it was either so commonplace it needn’t be mentioned, or, perhaps the existence or 
magnitude of the liability was unknown or unappreciated.  Incidentally, AES also had 
contingent liabilities relating to its trading arm NewEnergy, which was sold in July 2002, 
amounting to $260MM which is considerably less than NRG, especially given the 
relative size of the two firms.   
Prior to the bankruptcy of Enron, firms in the industry continued to receive 
accolades from analysts and the ratings agencies.  For example, Moody’s had upgraded 
Calpine in Oct 2001 and in doing so commented on the other investment grade firms 
(such as NRG): 
“Moody’s upgrades CPN to investment grade as per the following. This morning, 
October 2 [2001], Moody's Investor Services upgraded the senior unsecured debt 
of Calpine Corporation ... to investment grade -- from Ba1 to Baa3. Moody's 
outlook is stable. * Moody's listed 6 primary reasons for the upgrade, including: 
1) strong management 2) focused growth, vertical integration and operational 
commoditization strategies 3) demonstration of ability to implement those 
strategies 4) disciplined risk management 5) significant contracted power sales 
and gas hedges 6) Moody's projections demonstrating debt service coverage 
solely from contracted power sales of over 1x and debt service coverage 
comparable to other investment grade independent power issuers.”23  
Moody’s downgraded Calpine less than two months later in December, 2001 and then 
again in June 2002.  By October 2002, Calpine’s bonds were trading at yields greater 
than 30%.   
                                                 
22 Moody’s Rating Action, December 4, 2001 (note: the first public mention found was after an NRG 
analyst call December 15, 2001). 
23 Deutsche Banc Alex Brown Research Report on Moody’s downgrade (Oct 2, 2001) 
 135
The management of NRG and Xcel, on the other hand, did not seem to believe 
that it was possible to be downgraded.  They did not commit to take action to improve 
their liquidity even after being put on credit watch.  In fact, NRG continued to pursue the 
large acquisition that caused the December credit watch.  Xcel, NRG’s parent, was so 
sure it would not be downgraded that it bought the remaining shares of NRG to 
restructure it in-house which lead to its own downgrade.  Even the bond markets did not 
anticipate the possibility of the downgrade; NRG Senior Unsecured bonds traded 
approximately at par until late June 2002 when Xcel’s rating was lowered.   
The bankruptcies of Enron and Worldcom brought in a new era of increased 
scrutiny where behavior that had been justified or ignored in the past was now 
unacceptable.  Enron filed for Chapter 11 on Dec 2, 2001; days afterwards, all firms in 
the industry were downgraded or put on credit watch.  Worldcom filed for Chapter 11 on 
July 22, 2002; NRG’s credit rating was downgraded only four days later on July 26, 2002.    
X.   Conclusion 
This paper looked at the financial distress within the power industry particularly 
in the year 2002.  A commonly-used bankruptcy prediction model, the Z-score, was 
applied to firms in the industry to determine whether it could have predicted the ensuing 
bankruptcies.  The Z-scores for all firms in the industry were very low and therefore did 
not discriminate between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.  However, as a measure of 
default risk for the industry, the Z-score may be perfectly accurate.  Although most firms 
had had low Z-scores historically, the level of risk and exposure to cyclicality had 
increased as business models changed to embrace the new deregulated merchant energy 
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era.  Capital structures, leverage, and thus Z-scores should have changed to reduce that 
risk but did not.  As such, a sudden industry downturn resulted in distress and 
bankruptcies. 
Three firms were compared to understand the intricacies of the industry during 
2002.  AES and Calpine were distressed during 2002 and undertook restructuring; NRG 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The firms had exhibited similar growth over the past 
several years, and showed similarities in financial ratios.  There were differences 
however in their business models, capital structures, and reaction to the downturn in the 
market. 
The bankruptcy of NRG Energy however, was due to its reliance on an 
investment grade credit rating which caused it to amass an undue amount of contingent 
liabilities.  The management of NRG showed flagrant disregard for the warnings of the 
credit rating agencies, and did not attempt to restructure.  Even the bond markets did not 
believe that NRG would be downgraded.  When NRG was eventually downgraded, the 
contingent liabilities were triggered resulting in almost immediate insolvency and filing 
for Chapter 11. 
There has been a significant amount of value destruction related to the growth of 
this industry.  Enthusiasm by Wall Street, and relaxed ratings policies have resulted in 
significant over supply and difficult conditions that will persevere.    
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Appendix A :  Altman’s Z-Score 
The final form of the original Z-score is:  
Z = 1.2·X1 + 1.4·X2 + 3.3·X3 + 0.6·X4 +1.0·X5 
Where:  X1 = working capital/total assets, 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
X5 = sales/total assets, and 
Z = overall index where a score of less than 1.81 will predict 
bankruptcy and a score above 2.675 will predict not-bankruptcy. 
A later version of the Z-score called the “Z-double-prime” (Z’’) was developed 
which has the form: 
Z" = 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 
Where: X1 = working capital/total assets, 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
X4 = book value of equity/book value of total liabilities, 
Z" = overall index where a score of less than 1.1 will predict 
bankruptcy and a score above 2.6 will predict not-bankruptcy. 
Functionally the Z’’ is the same as the original z-score although the X5 term has 
been eliminated which allows a better comparison of firms/industries where asset 
turnover is unique or irrelevant.   
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Appendix B :  Firms Studied 
 Defaults Date of Default Total Liabilities
1 York Research Corp 2001 223
2 Covanta Energy Corp (formerly Ogden) 2002 3,180
3 NRG 2002 10,657
4 PG&E NEGT 2003 8,927
5 Northwestern Corp (Montana Power 2002/2003 3,129
6 Mirant 2003 16,460
 Total 42,576
 Distressed Date of Distress Total Liabilities
1 Calpine 2002 18,299 
2 Dynegy 2002 19,349
3 Williams 2002 32,862
4 Reliant 2002 6,308
5 Aquila 2002 9,397
6 El Paso 2002 38,815
7 Allegheny Energy 2002 8,384
8 AES 2002 31,197
9 CenterPoint Energy Inc. 2002 23,822
10 MidAmerican Energy Holidings 2002 10,907
11 Edison Mission Energy 2002 9,153
 Total 208,493
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Appendix C :  Further Detail of AES Restructuring 
AES Refinancing 
The refinancing consisted of three steps. 
1) Refinance current and near-term debt with “super” seniority notes and secured 
credit facility with short term debt giving generous terms for noteholders and new credit 
providers. (Compare 2001 to 2002 debt profiles) 
2) Refinance mid-term debt to create a flatter debt profile.  AES accomplished 
this with the May, 2003 private placement and continuing asset sales. (Compare 2002 to 
2003 debt profiles) 
3) Repay high interest rate debt and lower carrying costs.  AES continued to cut 
debt through 2004 with asset sales and an equity offering. (Compare 2003 to 2004 debt 
profiles.) 
All of the steps of the refinancing involved a commitment by management to 
improve liquidity by selling assets.  Selling assets will always involve a tradeoff between 
liquidity and cash flows.  Selling assets will inevitably reduce cash flows and may limit 
the firm’s ongoing viability.  An examination of Figure 9 shows consolidated revenues 
and gross margin by region and year for AES, indicates that cash flows are at or above 
pre-distress levels even after asset sales.  Gross margin and revenues from South America 
however, have increased substantially, indicating a larger exposure to these economies. 
AES’ debt maturities have been pushed substantially into the future.  
Approximately $500 and $600MM come due in 2007 and 2008 respectively.  They have 
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decreased their cost of debt and have substantial liquidity.  Their current revolver is 
virtually undrawn with a 650MM limit doesn’t come due for renewal until 2007.  
Figure 9: AES Revenues and Gross Margin by Region 
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Table 15: Details of December 2002 Refinancing (AES) 
Retired debt New debt Details 
300MM, 8.75% Dec 15, 2002 305MM  10% Sr. Secured 2005 
200 MM , 7.375% Jun 2003   
- 65% of FV in cash immed. (300) 
- 35% new 10% notes  (300) 
- exchange at FV (200) 
850MM, L+200 Mar 2003 
425MM, L+250 Aug 2003 
262MM, L+238 Jul 2003 
52.2GBP, L+250 2004 
1,600MM Sr. Secured 
Credit Facility 
LIBOR+650 
Nov-04  
Jul-05 
-50% due Nov’04 and 50% due 
Nov’05 
-1st lien on 100% of AES equity in 
subs 
 
 
New notes and credit facilities are secured against 100% of equity in AES domestic subs and 65% of equity in certain 
overseas businesses 
Cash from all new debt issuances, equity issuances, assets sales and parent level EBITDA must in part go to pay down 
new debt 
Required to repay $810mm of credit facility by Nov 25, 2004 
Increase in interest expense of $65MM per year. 
 
Table 16: Details of May 2003 Private Placement 
Retired debt New debt Details 
475MM Sr.Sec.Credit 2005 
49MM Sr. Notes (8%) 2008 
180MM Sr. Notes (8.75%) 2008 
1,200MM (8.75%)  
600MM (9%) 
2013  
2015 
2nd priority to Senior Notes 
and credit facility issued Dec 
2002 
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Retired debt New debt Details 
283MM Sr. Notes (9.5%) 2009 
463MM Sr. Notes (9.375%) 2010 
250MM Sr. Notes (8.875%) 2011 
   
Total = $1.7 billion Total = $1.8 billion  
 
Table 17:  Summary of AES Debt Structure before and after distress 
    After 
Refi 
After Pvt 
Pl 
 Int Rate Mat. 2001 2002 2003 
Corporate Revolving Bank Loan Var 2002 70   
Corporate Revolving Bank Loan 8.10% 2005  228  
Corporate Revolving Bank Loan 8.10% 2007    
Senior Secured Term Loan 5.13% 2008   300 
Senior Secured Term Loan 5.32% 2008   400 
Term Loan  2003 425   
Term Loan  2002 188   
Term Loan (50% due 2004) 8.12% 2005  500  
Term Loan (50% due 2004) 7.99% 2005  427  
Term Loan (50% due 2004) 7.94% 2005  260  
Total First Priority   683 1,415 700 
First Priority as % of Total   11% 21% 12% 
      
Senior Notes 8.75% 2002 300   
Senior Notes 8% 2008 200 199 150 
Senior Notes 8.75% 2008 400 400 223 
Senior Notes 9.50% 2009 750 750 470 
Senior Notes 9.38% 2010 850 850 423 
Senior Notes 8.88% 2011 600 537 313 
Senior Notes 8.80% 2011 196 217 170 
Senior Notes 10% 2005  258 232 
Senior Notes (2nd priority) 8.75% 2013   1200 
Senior Notes (2nd priority) 9.00% 2015   600 
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    After 
Refi 
After Pvt 
Pl 
 Int Rate Mat. 2001 2002 2003 
Remarketable or Redeemable Sec. 7.38% 2003 200 26  
Total Senior Notes   3,496 3,237 3,781 
Senior Notes as % of Total   55% 48% 64% 
      
Sr. Sub. Notes 10.25% 2006 250 231  
Sr. Sub. Notes 8.38% 2007 325 316 210 
Sr. Sub. Notes 8.50% 2007 375 349 259 
Sr. Sub. Notes 8.88% 2027 125 125 115 
Conv. Jr. Sub. Debentures 4.50% 2005 150 150 150 
Conv. Jr. Sub. Debentures 6% 2008 460 460 213 
Conv. Jr. Sub. Debentures 6.75% 2029 518 518 517 
Total Sub. Or Jr. Sub   2,203 2,149 1,464 
Subordinated as % of total   35% 32% 25% 
      
Total Recourse Debt   6,382 6,801 5,945 
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AES Debt Maturity Schedule Before, During and After Refinancing 
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Appendix D :  Further Details of Calpine Restructuring 
 
Table 18: Summary of July 11, 2003 $3.3B refinancing: 
Old Debt   New Debt   
May 2004 Term Loan $950  4 year term loan $750  
2005 Corporate Revolver $450  2007 2nd Priority Secured $500  
2004 Puttable Convertible $400  2010 2nd Priority Secured $1,150  
Effective debt retirement 
@$0.90 $1,450  2013 2
nd Priority Secured $900  
Fees $50    
Total $3,300  Total $3,300  
Increase in pre tax interest cost: $43MM 
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Appendix E :  NRG Balance Sheet After Restructuring 
Balance Sheet Common Size 
 2001 2003 2001 2003 
Current Assets      1,187 2,113 9% 23% 
Net PP&E      9,432 4,416 73% 48% 
Investments in Projects      1,051 745 8% 8% 
Other Non-Current Assets      1,224 1,986 9% 21% 
Total Assets     12,895 9,260 100% 100% 
  
Current Liabilities      1,951 2,026 15% 22% 
Minority Interest           68 37 1% 0% 
Non-Recourse Debt      4,871 0 38%
Recourse Debt      2,972 3,661 23%
40% 
Other Non-Current Liabilities         795 1,099 6% 12% 
Total Liabilities     10,657 6,823 83% 74% 
  
Retained Earnings         635 11 5% 0% 
Total Equity      2,237 2,437 17% 26% 
Total Liabilities and Equity     12,895 9,260 100% 100% 
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